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Abstract 
Physics-based models are routinely used to predict the 
performance of engineered systems to make decisions such as 
when to retire system components, how to extend the life of 
an aging system, or if a new design will be safe or available. 
Model verification and validation (V&V) is a process to 
establish credibility in model predictions. Ideally, carefully 
controlled validation experiments will be designed and 
performed to validate models or submodels. In reality, time 
and cost constraints limit experiments and even model 
development. This paper describes elements of model V&V 
during the development and application of a probabilistic 
fracture assessment model to predict cracking in space shuttle 
main engine high-pressure oxidizer turbopump knife-edge 
seals. 
The objective of this effort was to assess the probability of 
initiating and growing a crack to a specified failure length in 
specific flight units for different usage and inspection 
scenarios. The probabilistic fracture assessment model 
developed in this investigation combined a series of 
submodels describing the usage, temperature history, flutter 
tendencies, tooth stresses and numbers of cycles, fatigue 
cracking, nondestructive inspection, and finally the 
probability of failure. The analysis accounted for unit-to-unit 
variations in temperature, flutter limit state, flutter stress 
magnitude, and fatigue life properties. The investigation 
focused on the calculation of relative risk rather than absolute 
risk between the usage scenarios. Verification predictions 
were first performed for three units with known usage and 
cracking histories to establish credibility in the model 
predictions. Then, numerous predictions were performed for 
an assortment of operating units that had flown recently or 
that were projected for future flights. Calculations were 
performed using two NASA-developed software tools: 
NESSUS® for the probabilistic analysis, and NASGRO® for 
the fracture mechanics analysis. The goal of these predictions 
was to provide additional information to guide decisions on 
the potential of reusing existing and installed units prior to the 
new design certification. 
Introduction 
Numerical models are routinely used to predict the 
performance of engineered systems. Government and industry 
now routinely rely on model predictions to make such 
decisions as when to retire system components, how to extend 
the life of an aging system, or if a new design will be safe or 
available. The validity of many models used to predict the 
performance of existing engineered systems have been 
assessed through historical data but this type of validation is 
not possible for new designs or designs used in different 
environments. The validation of new models using experiments 
becomes more difficult and costly as the complexity and 
reliability requirements increase. For example, a highly reliable 
aircraft engine component is difficult to test to failure under 
operating conditions due to the high reliability. In addition, it 
may be cost prohibitive to actually test an expensive 
component to failure. Other systems are impractical to test 
such as the in vivo measurement of performance measures in 
human subjects or systems in extreme environments. Valid 
model predictions become increasingly important as the cost, 
reliability, and experimental complexity for the engineered 
system increases.  
Model verification and validation (V&V) provides a 
systematic approach to establishing confidence in model 
predictions. Most models requiring this level of validation are 
complex one-of-a-kind problems and have different time and 
budget constraints. Experience has shown that a standard and 
consistent model V&V methodology may not be practical for 
these types of problems. This observation is supported by the 
fact that there are no general standards for model V&V at this 
time. However, there are several V&V guidelines produced by 
technical committees for computational fluids dynamics 
(Ref. 1) and solids mechanics (Ref. 2). 
The goal of model V&V is to establish credibility in the 
model predictions that guide engineering decisions. In many 
cases the credibility is established in the engineering process. 
For example, models are developed by experienced analyst and 
compared to historical data or a single experiment. 
Conservative values of loads and material strengths may be 
used to mitigate uncertainties about these parts of the models. 
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This process may also include design and/or peer reviews to 
further establish credibility in the model predictions. From a 
high level view, a formal model V&V effort would include 
validation experiments and metrics that quantify the 
agreement between model predictions and experiments. In 
practical applications, the validation experiments may be cost 
or time prohibitive and analysis must rely on historical 
performance information or qualification experiments for the 
comparison. In addition, there may be few experiments or 
limited historical data for a rigorous statistical quantitative 
comparison between the model predictions and experiments. 
Finally, model approximations may be required along with 
engineering estimates of model parameters due to the time 
and cost constraints. These approximations, assumptions, and 
limited data lead to uncertainty in both the model predictions 
and experiments. Thus uncertainty quantification is an 
integral part of the model V&V process. 
The goal of this paper is to describe the development of a 
model that could credibly predict the performance of a 
complex engineered system for different operating conditions 
within a tight time and cost budget. The model was developed 
by experienced analysts, compared to historical data, and peer 
reviewed frequently. While a formal V&V process was 
desired, and engineering approach was required to establish 
credibility in the model predictions. This paper captures some 
of the experience gained that can benefit future model V&V 
efforts. 
Verification and Validation 
Model verification and validation (V&V) is an enabling 
methodology for the development of computational models 
that can be used to make predictions with quantified 
confidence. Model V&V procedures are needed to reduce the 
time, cost, and risk associated with component and full-scale 
testing of products, materials, and engineered systems. 
Quantifying the confidence and predictive accuracy of model 
calculations provides the decision-maker with the information 
necessary for making a risk-informed decision. 
Model V&V is the primary process for quantifying and 
building credibility in computational models. Verification is 
the process of determining that a model implementation 
accurately represents the developer’s conceptual description 
of the model and its solution. Validation is the process of 
determining the degree to which a model is an accurate 
representation of the real world from the perspective of the 
intended uses of the model (Ref. 2). In short, verification is a 
mathematics issue, whereas validation is a physics issue. 
Uncertainty quantification plays a key role in model V&V. 
There is uncertainty in the model predictions due to inherent 
and subjective uncertainties in the model. Likewise, the 
measurements that are made to validate these simulation 
outputs also contain errors and uncertainties. While the 
experimental outcome is used as the reference for 
comparison, the V&V process does not presume the 
experiment to be more accurate than the simulation. Instead, 
the goal is to quantify the uncertainties in both experimental 
and simulation results such that the model fidelity requirements 
can be assessed (validation) and the predictive accuracy of the 
model quantified. 
Uncertainty Quantification 
Uncertainty quantification in the context of model V&V is 
use to explicitly account for errors and variations in the model 
and model input parameters and quantify their impact on the 
model predictions. These errors and variations are classified 
more generally as uncertainties; where uncertainties are 
classified as either irreducible (aleatory) or reducible 
(epistemic or model error). Examples of aleatory or natural 
variations include variations in geometry from manufacturing, 
material properties, and environmental loads. These types of 
uncertainties can generally be described by a probability 
density function. Epistemic uncertainties are general model 
errors such as limited data to fit a PDF (e.g., few experiments 
to characterize the mean and standard deviation of yield 
strength) and model form (choice of constitutive material 
formulation, boundary conditions, and finite element mesh 
discretization). The uncertainty propagation concept is shown 
in Figure 1. The model parameters are modeled as PDFs on the 
left, an appropriate probabilistic algorithm is used to propagate 
these PDFs through the model (center), resulting in variations 
in the performance of the system shown by the reliability 
function on the right. Many uncertainty propagation methods 
also quantify the importance of the uncertain parameters to the 
overall model prediction uncertainty. These contributions are 
represented by the bar chart on the right. The dashed lines on 
the PDFs on the left represent epistemic uncertainty such as 
limited data used to estimate parameters for the PDF. These 
epistemic uncertainties can also be propagated to quantify their 
impact on the reliability function using appropriate methods. 
There are many mature methods to propagating uncertainties 
when they can be modeled by PDFs. These methods are 
usually classified as probabilistic methods and include 
sampling methods, most probable point (MPP) methods, and 
hybrid methods (combined sampling and MPP) among others. 
Problems with ill-behaved limit-states or with multiple limit-
states, however, generally require the use of sampling based 
methods or a hybrid approach (Refs. 3 and 4). 
 
 
Figure 1.—Uncertainty propagation.  
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Sampling methods such as Monte Carlo or Latin 
Hypercube Simulation (LHS) repeatedly evaluate the 
deterministic model to generate samples of the model 
response, from which the response statistics and probability 
of failure are approximated. A major advantage of sampling 
methods is that the deterministic model does not need to be 
simplified or approximated to perform the probabilistic 
analysis. Thus, problems with multiple failure modes and/or 
ill-behaved response functions can be solved without 
difficulty. Another advantage is that the error in the solution 
can be measured. A significant disadvantage of sampling is 
that the probabilistic analysis can become quite costly due to 
the large number of samples required to compute small failure 
probabilities. One approach to improve the efficiency of 
sampling based methods is to focus the samples in the 
important (failure) regions. This class of sampling methods is 
called importance sampling and can be orders of magnitude 
more efficient than Monte Carlo simulation (Ref. 5). 
Case Study 
Cracking of space shuttle main engine (SSME) high-
pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) knife-edge seals 
(KES) has been observed in several units. Although this 
cracking did not resulted in the complete fracture of any units, 
the consequences of such a fracture could be severe. As a 
result, life limits had been imposed that effectively required 
the complete replacement of the units following each flight, 
with substantial cost and schedule implications. 
Extensive prior investigations by Pratt & Whitney 
Rocketdyne (PWR) and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC) determined that these seals are sensitive to fluid-
structure instability, or flutter. The relationships between 
various build parameters (clearances and gaps) and 
operational environments (local temperatures and pressures) 
and flutter tendencies were established using flutter 
experiments on actual seals. The most severely cracked unit 
was noted to have experienced a flutter event of 
approximately 15-sec duration during an early green run 
(ground test run), although the relative significance of this 
green run versus subsequent flight exposure for the observed 
cracking was not clear. Subsequent rig testing confirmed the 
flutter hypothesis. Structural analysis identified the flutter 
modes most likely to cause cracking and confirmed that local 
flutter stress levels could be severe enough to cause crack 
formation and growth. 
To reduce risk of HPOTP recycles impacting the STS 
manifest, effort was undertaken by PWR to develop an on 
pump inspection capability to reduce the recycle schedule 
within the existing Deviation Approval Request (DAR) of 
completing an inspection at 50 percent of the life limit and 
then flying to the life limit. However, the impact of this 
approach on the probability of KES cracking was not known. 
Also unknown were the risk implications of flying the seal to 
the life limit with no inspection as an alternate method to 
reduce schedule risk without significantly increasing technical 
risk. 
This effort was performed in parallel to a complete redesign 
of the turbopump knife-edge seal configuration. The goal of 
these predictions was to provide additional information to 
guide decisions on the potential of reusing existing and 
installed units prior to the new design certification. 
Problem Statement and Strategy 
This investigation focused on cracking in the Turbine Outlet 
Duct (Outboard) 4 Tooth Seal. Analysis was conducted for 
Tooth A, which exhibited the highest dynamic stresses under 
the relevant flutter modes. “Failure” due to cracking in the seal 
was defined as the development of a 0.075 in. radial through 
crack in the seal tooth, which corresponds to crack growth 
through the entire tooth, up to the edge of the web. This is a 
conservative definition of failure, since cracks have been 
observed to grow into the web without causing complete 
fracture of the seal. The objective of the effort was to assess the 
probability of initiating and growing a crack to this length in 
specific flight units. The analysis accounted for unit-to-unit 
variations in temperature, flutter stress magnitude, and fatigue 
life properties. 
The assessment was performed for four different usage and 
inspection scenarios, employing consistent assumptions about 
common variables: 
 
1. Current flight requirements: A new seal experiencing 1 
green run and 1 flight. 
2. A new seal experiencing 1 green run and 1 flight, followed 
by an eddy-current inspection, and then an additional 
green run and flight. 
3. A new seal experiencing 1 green run and 3 subsequent 
flights with no inspection or replacement. 
4. A new seal experiencing 1 green run, 1 nominal flight, and 
1 flight containing an abort. 
 
This investigation focused on the calculation of relative risk 
rather than absolute risk. In other words, how much does the 
risk change for the different usage/inspection scenarios? These 
calculated risk numbers were also put into perspective by 
comparing them with calculated risk numbers for specific units 
with known cracking histories. The number of cracks and crack 
sizes for the units with known cracking histories were used as a 
form of validation data. The models were used to predict the 
variation in crack size for the units with known histories and 
compared to the cracking history to establish credibility in the 
model predictions. 
The physics of the fluid-structure interactions are complex in 
this severe and uncertain loading environment, and thus 
empirical models based on experimental data were used for 
portions of the model to predict flutter and flutter stresses. 
Once load conditions were estimated using this combination of 
empirical and numerical models, established fatigue crack 
growth models were applied to predict the extent of crack 
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propagation during green runs or flights. Model predictions 
were compared to selected cracking data to validate the 
model. 
Calculations were performed using two NASA-developed 
software tools: NESSUS (Ref. 6) for the probabilistic 
analysis, and NASGRO (Ref. 7) for the fracture mechanics 
analysis. NESSUS is a general-purpose probabilistic analysis 
program with a suite of traditional and advanced probabilistic 
methods. NASGRO, which is the standard fracture control 
software for all NASA Centers, computes fatigue crack 
growth (FCG) and fracture for different materials, loads, and 
structural geometries. 
Probabilistic Fracture Assessment Model 
The probabilistic fracture assessment model developed and 
used in this investigation combined a series of submodels 
describing the usage, temperature history, flutter tendencies, 
tooth stresses and numbers of cycles, fatigue cracking, 
nondestructive inspection, and finally the probability of 
failure (Fig. 2). Usage information characterized the different 
sequences of green runs and flights considered for each unit. 
The temperature model predicted the turbine exit temperature 
history and associated uncertainty for each unit as a function 
of time. The flutter model used operating conditions and build 
clearances to determine key parameters (ACD Ratio and DP) 
that are predictors of flutter tendencies and then compared 
these parameters with the flutter limit state to determine the 
flutter condition at each time increment in the history. The 
stress model interpreted the flutter model to predict dynamic 
stress amplitudes in the seal tooth at these time increments and 
assign numbers of cycles based on flutter frequencies. The 
fatigue model used high cycle fatigue and fatigue crack growth 
properties to perform an integrated fatigue crack initiation and 
growth simulation for the seal tooth subjected to these stress 
amplitudes with known stress gradients and superimposed 
static stresses. Where appropriate, the inspection model 
simulated a probabilistic eddy current inspection and 
determined if a crack was detected. The probability of failure 
(crack size > 0.075 in.) occurring in each unit for each usage 
scenario was calculated and compared with benchmark failure 
probabilities calculated for verification units with known usage 
and cracking histories. The analysis accounted for unit-to-unit 
variations and uncertainties in temperature, flutter limit state, 
flutter stress magnitude, and fatigue life properties.  
The probabilistic fracture model components were integrated 
using two NASA-developed software tools: NESSUS for the 
probabilistic analysis and NASGRO for the fracture mechanics 
analysis. The random variables included the temperature 
distribution variations, flutter limit state uncertainty, the 
maximum flutter stress, the flutter frequency, the uncertainty 
on the fatigue crack growth model, and probability of detection 
for the inspection. The number of random variables needed to 
define the temperature model is case specific and also depends 
on the use of measured or model based temperature histories. 
The different cases have different numbers of green runs and 
starts. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.—Probabilistic fracture assessment model flow chart. 
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The highly nonlinear crack growth response and non-
continuous response functions required the use of a sampling-
based method to compute the probability of failure and the 
cumulative distribution function. The probabilistic analysis 
for each unit and usage scenario was performed using the 
Monte Carlo simulation algorithm in NESSUS.  
HPOTP Usage Scenarios 
The green run is a start that operates the turbopump through 
all potential power settings to verify correct operation of new 
and rebuilt pumps. Two durations of the green run profile are 
used depending on the rebuild status of the pump: pumps that 
are new or have a major rebuild use the long green run, and 
those with minor rebuilds use a short green run profile. The 
standard flight profile consists of a short duration 
104.5 percent power setting followed by the so-called 
“bucket” decrease in power (to reduce aerodynamic forces) 
and then by a long duration 104.5 percent power setting until 
orbit is reached. 
Temperature Models 
The turbine exit temperature was found to be one of the 
most important variables affecting KES flutter and fatigue 
cracking. This temperature is one of the key inputs to the 
calculation of the ACD ratio and DP values (see the following 
section on Flutter Models), which directly impact dynamic 
stresses. Measured turbine exit temperature profiles were 
available for previously flown units. Measured temperatures 
were obviously unavailable for unflown units, so a model was 
developed to estimate the temperatures associated with these 
units. Both the measured and model-based temperatures 
considered uncertainties. These temperature models were then 
combined to generate full temperature histories for each 
usage scenario based on defined power profiles for green 
runs, normal flights, and aborts. 
Flutter Models 
Evaluation of the flutter rig experimental data by PWR 
indicated that tendencies for flutter were predicted by 
particular combinations of values of the ACD ratio and a 
specific pressure drop DP. The ACD ratio is a function of the 
geometry of the seals. The model for flutter developed in this 
study, therefore, consisted of two parts. The first part of the 
model involved predicting values of the ACD ratio and DP for 
specific units as a function of build clearances and operating 
conditions (power setting and temperature). The second part 
of the model involved defining a “flutter limit state” (FLS) 
that related these ACD and DP values to flutter occurrence.  
Two of the key inputs into the flutter limit state model are 
the definition of the ACD ratio and pressure differential for 
the current unit. The ACD ratio is defined by the effective 
areas of the seal geometry. These values are functions of the 
as-built clearances and associated operating conditions. The 
pressure differential (DP) is measured across the four-tooth 
seal. The ACD and DP values were computed using a 
proprietary flow network solver for each unit configuration, 
temperature, and power setting. A simple regression model was 
developed to describe the changes in ACD and DP due to 
changes in power level and turbine exit temperature for a 
single unit. This regression model could then be used to predict 
ACD and DP values for any unit and any combination of power 
level and turbine exit temperature, given that a single anchor 
point (ACD vs. DP for a specific power level and temperature) 
for this unit was provided by a flow network solver. 
PWR had developed a flutter test rig to investigate whether 
flow-induced flutter was a credible failure scenario and to 
characterize the flutter sensitivity and dynamic response of the 
KES through parametric variations of flow and clearance 
conditions. These experiments did not include service 
temperatures, two-phase flow, or rotation of an actual unit. 
However, the experiments were expected to predict similar 
flutter strain response to the operating units for comparable 
controlled values of ACD and DP, and therefore the flutter rig 
tests were used as the basis for the developed flutter models. 
When flutter occurred, dynamic strains in the seal teeth 
increased dramatically, and therefore large measured dynamic 
strains served as an indication of flutter. 
As noted earlier, the ACD ratio and DP values were found to 
correlate with tendencies for flutter; in particular, flutter was 
found to occur at higher values of ACD and DP. Three flutter 
rig experiments were performed and points in ACD-DP space 
were identified corresponding to flutter conditions and no-
flutter conditions. This line is called the “flutter limit state” 
(FLS). 
The validity of this line was verified by comparing predicted 
strains to the experiments. Approximate upper and lower 
bounds on this FLS were set visually to account for some of 
the misclassification of flutter and no-flutter points. These 
approximate upper and lower bounds were assumed to 
correspond to plus or minus three standard deviations from the 
central tendency (mean value) FLS. Uncertainty in the FLS 
was modeled (using these approximate standard deviations) as 
a parallel shift that changed the intercept of the FLS line but 
not its slope. Attempts to refine the FLS uncertainty model 
using more rigorous statistical regressions were not supported 
by the available data. The uncertainty model was judged to be 
sufficiently accurate for the relative probability comparisons 
between different units. 
Stress Model 
Flutter conditions have to be quantified into specific KES 
tooth stress levels in order to perform fatigue assessments. An 
approximate stress model was developed to serve this purpose. 
In this approximate model, the amplitude of the dynamic 
stresses was assumed to be directly proportional to the 
perpendicular distance (d) from the FLS in ACD-DP space. At 
the FLS, the dynamic stress amplitude was assumed to be zero. 
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The engine upper operating threshold was used to define the 
maximum possible perpendicular distance (D) away from the 
FLS. The intercept of the engine upper operating threshold 
was defined for a specific unit at 104.5 percent green run 
power setting in ACD-DP space. 
A wide range of flutter modes is possible in the knife-edge 
seal. The 8th nodal diameter mode (and its close neighbors) is 
believed to be the most severe stress condition and also the 
primary source of cracking of a known cracked unit. 
Therefore, the stress model used in this study was focused on 
the 8th nodal diameter mode. 
The maximum possible dynamic stress amplitude value was 
taken to be the predicted stress in the 8th nodal diameter mode 
for the seal at the maximum possible deflection value, which is 
defined by the clearance. This dynamic stress value was 
determined for the known cracked unit and assigned a normal 
distribution with a coefficient of variation of 10 percent. The 
actual standard deviations were not known for this variable, but 
these values were used consistently for all analyses in order to 
support relative probability comparisons between units. A 
uniform static stress was also superimposed, representing 
nominal conditions without flutter. 
Fatigue Model 
The HPOTP knife edge seals are fabricated from Incoloy 
909 and experience in-service metal temperatures of about 
250 to 350 °F in a two-phase, fuel-rich steam environment 
comprising a mixture of GH2, steam, and liquid water. 
Fatigue crack growth (FCG) rate data for this material in a 
GH2 plus steam environment at 300 °F had been previously 
generated from compact tension (through crack) and surface 
crack specimens under both constant amplitude and K-
gradient load histories at a variety of stress ratios. These data, 
corrected for crack closure (Ref. 8), were used to develop the 
NASGRO fatigue crack growth relation. No threshold was 
included in this model. 
A small-crack model, originally proposed by El Haddad 
(Ref. 9), was used to model fatigue crack growth initiation. 
This small-crack model results in a non-zero growth rate for 
vanishingly small physical crack sizes. As the crack size 
increases, the small-crack effects become increasing 
negligible. In this way, the small-crack model facilitates a 
single FCG analysis that incorporates both initiation and 
propagation phases of life over the entire range of crack sizes. 
This approach is preferable to a more traditional calculation 
of crack “initiation” life based on the failure of a smooth test 
specimen, because the entire KES tooth is actually smaller 
than the customary smooth fatigue specimen. The small-crack 
model was developed from available smooth HCF data at 
300 °F in a GH2 + steam environment in both the nominal 
material condition and a pre-exposed (supercharged) material 
condition. 
Fatigue cracking was modeled as a corner crack in a 
rectangular plate that transitions into a through edge crack in 
a plate of variable thickness. NASGRO analyses were 
performed with a special pre-production version of the 
software in order to take advantage of two new weight function 
(WF) stress intensity factor (SIF) solutions that had not yet 
been implemented in the current (at the time of the 
investigation) production version, NASGRO 5.0. The first new 
SIF solution was a univariant WF solution for the corner crack 
in a plate based on the classical Shen and Glinka approach 
(Ref. 10). The second SIF solution was a univariant WF 
solution for the through edge crack in a plate of variable 
thickness with arbitrary stress gradients along the length of the 
plate. Both solutions were modified to include small-crack 
effects. The NASGRO source code was further modified to 
facilitate a direct transition from the corner crack to the 
through edge crack at a crack of 95 percent of the plate width. 
Inspection Model 
A special eddy current inspection (ECI) method was 
developed for an on pump inspection capability to reduce the 
recycle schedule within the existing Deviation Approval 
Request (DAR) of completing an inspection at 50 percent of 
the life limit and then flying to the life limit. This investigation 
was performed to assess the risk implications of that approach. 
This inspection was included in one usage scenario (denoted as 
Case 2), which contained a green run and flight, followed by 
the ECI inspection, and then (if no crack was detected) another 
green run and flight. The inspection model compared the 
predicted crack length following a green run and flight with a 
detectable flaw size. If the predicted crack length after the first 
green run and flight was less than the detectable flaw size, the 
predicted flaw was not detected. The seal would then be 
subjected to a second green run and flight, from which a final 
crack length would be predicted. 
Not all flaws that exceed a nominal detectable length will 
actually be detected. The detectable flaw size is not a 
deterministic value, but has some uncertainty due to the 
efficacy of the inspection method. This uncertainly is 
characterized as the probability of detection (POD). The POD 
is the (cumulative) probability of detecting flaws greater than a 
given crack length. 
Probabilistic Fracture Assessment Predictions 
The probabilistic fracture assessment predictions were 
performed using (1) “verification” units to demonstrate the 
predictive capability of the developed models and (2) 
“operating” units to predict the probabilities associated with 
current and future flight units. The verification units were 
chosen for their different temperature history severities and 
known cracking conditions. The operating units were recently 
flown or were scheduled for a future flight. The probabilistic 
predictions were performed using the specific temperature and 
build conditions for each unit. 
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Verification Units 
Verification predictions were first performed for three units 
with known usage and cracking histories. Unit A had 
experienced a severe thermal history and had exhibited severe 
cracking. Unit B had experienced many starts, slightly 
elevated temperatures, and substantial cracking (this unit had 
one through tooth crack of 0.075 in. and numerous smaller 
cracks). Unit C had limited exposure, a benign build, and no 
observed cracking. The fracture assessment model 
successfully predicted the contrasting failure probabilities that 
were consistent with the observed cracking behavior for all 
three units. Unit B is used as the baseline unit for relative 
reliability comparisons of operating units. More informed 
decisions for using a unit for an additional flight without 
inspection can be made by assessing the relative reliability 
with respect to unit B. 
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the final 
crack size is shown in Figure 3 for each of the three 
verification units. The left y-axis displays the cumulative 
probability in standard normal units. The crack size is plotted 
in log scale along the bottom axis. This CDF indicates 
reliability—the cumulative probability that the crack size is 
less than a specific crack size. The probability of failure is one 
minus the reliability. A comparison of the CDFs in Figure 3 for 
each verification unit demonstrates the validity of the 
developed models. Unit C was expected to have the least crack 
growth due to its location in ACD-DP space and benign 
temperatures. Unit A was expected to have the largest cracks. 
Unit B was expected be somewhere in between. The results 
shown in Figure 3 support the relative predictive capability of 
the models. The probabilistic results for the operating units 
summarized in the next section are compared to the model 
predictions for unit B in order to make a relative comparison to 
two known cracked cases. 
Operating Units 
Using the verified models, predictions were performed for an 
assortment of operating units that had flown recently or that 
were projected for future flights. These computations assessed 
the final crack size distribution and probability of failure for 
the various usage scenarios. All results were normalized 
against similar predictions for the baseline verification unit B. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.—CDF of final crack size for the verification units. 
Unit A
Unit BUnit C
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Figure 4.—CDF of final crack size for an operating unit. 
 
The deterministic and probabilistic variables needed for the 
probabilistic fracture assessment model were described for 
each part of the model. Each unit analyzed was defined by the 
build parameters and temperature history profiles. The 
temperature random variable definitions were different for 
each unit and case (usage scenario). Parameters for the flutter, 
stress, FCG, and inspection models were the same for each 
analyzed unit and usage scenario. The cases are described 
below: 
 
· Case 1 requires one green run and one flight.  
· Case 2 adds the inspection and another green run and 
flight. Additional random variables were required for 
the temperature model to account for the green run and 
flight after inspection. The inspection model also 
requires the distribution for detectable crack sizes. 
· Case 3 requires one green run and three flights with 
additional temperature variables to account for the 
temperature variability between each flight. 
 
An operating unit has a known green run temperature 
history, and the initial analysis used the model-based flight 
temperature history for the three operating scenarios. This 
unit was flown during this study so a measured flight 
temperature history also became available. The Case 1 usage 
scenario was also analyzed using the measured flight 
temperature history. The CDFs for this unit for the different 
scenarios are shown in Figure 4 along with the CDF for unit 
B for a relative comparison. Case 1 using the model-based 
temperature history shows a higher reliability compared to 
unit B. Adding two additional flights (Case 3) introduced a 
slight reliability penalty but still demonstrated a higher 
reliability than unit B. The addition of the inspection (Case 2) 
reduced the reliability below that predicted for unit B. The 
additional green run required after the inspection increased the 
exposure at the high power setting so the unit experienced 
additional time in the flutter region. In this case, the additional 
green run required following inspection is more damaging than 
two additional flights. Finally, the unit was also analyzed using 
the actual flown temperature histories. The CDF using the 
measured temperature values demonstrated a higher reliability 
than that using the model-based temperature history. The 
measured flight temperature history removed some of the 
uncertainty from the temperature model. In this case, the 
model-based temperature history was conservative (a lower 
reliability was computed). 
Case Study Summary 
The impact of different usage and inspection scenarios on 
fatigue cracking due to flutter in SSME HPOTP knife-edge 
seals was assessed. A probabilistic fracture assessment model 
was developed that combined a series of submodels describing 
the usage, temperature history, flutter tendencies, tooth stresses 
and numbers of cycles, fatigue cracking, nondestructive 
inspection, and finally the probability of failure. The 
probability of failure (crack size > 0.075 in.) occurring in each 
unit for each usage scenario was calculated and compared with 
benchmark failure probabilities calculated for verification units 
with known usage and cracking histories. The analysis 
accounted for unit-to-unit variations and uncertainties in 
temperature, flutter limit state, flutter stress magnitude, and 
fatigue life properties. Calculations were performed using two 
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Baseline (Unit B)
Case 1 with measured 
temperature
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NASA-developed software tools: NESSUS for the 
probabilistic analysis and NASGRO for the fracture 
mechanics analysis. 
Verification predictions were first performed for three units 
with known usage and cracking histories. The probabilistic 
fracture assessment model successfully predicted widely 
contrasting failure probabilities that were consistent with the 
observed cracking behavior for all three units. Numerous 
predictions were performed for an assortment of operating 
units that had flown recently or that were projected for future 
flights, and all of these results were tabulated. These 
computations assessed the final crack size distribution and 
probability of failure for the various usage scenarios. While 
absolute reliability values were not predicted, more informed 
decisions for using a unit for an additional flight without 
inspection can be made by assessing the relative reliability 
with respect to the baseline unit. 
Conclusions 
This paper describes the development and application of a 
probabilistic fracture assessment model to analyze cracking in 
the SSME HPOTP knife edge seals. The probabilistic fracture 
assessment model consisted of a series of submodels, each of 
which had their own physics, assumptions, and uncertainties. 
The development of each submodel included some level of 
verification and validation leading to improved confidence in 
the predictive capability of the integrated probabilistic 
fracture assessment model. Due to time and cost constraints 
for using these models to make decisions, rigorous model 
V&V was not performed for each submodel. However, many 
concepts for model V&V were exercised during the 
engineering model development process such as verification 
of each submodel, validation against experimental results 
when available, model comparison to historical data for 
model validation, and frequent peer reviews. 
Model V&V is a process to establish credibility in model 
predictions. Ideally, carefully controlled validation 
experiments will be designed and performed to validate 
models or submodels. In reality, time and cost constraints 
limit experiments and even model development. Communica-
tion of the assumptions and uncertainties are even more 
important due to these constraints. Incorporating UQ into the 
model predictions provides a rigorous approach to 
communicate the impact of assumptions and uncertainties in 
the model predictions. A major benefit of this process is 
communicating the model and data assumptions and 
uncertainties for peer reviews and to the decision makers. Thus 
decisions based on model predictions can be made in light of 
the assumptions and uncertainties. 
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